The Battle of Britain, 1940
On the afternoon of 15 September 1940, Winston Churchill drove out to the operations room of No. 11 Group at Uxbridge, west of London, and watched from the gallery as the lights on the wall board showed every one of the group's squadrons in action. When he asked what reserves were left, the group's commander, Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, told him there were none. That day two large German raids on London were broken up, and two days later Hitler postponed the invasion of Britain.
Few battles are as well known, and few have collected so many myths: that the RAF was hopelessly outnumbered, that the Spitfire won it, that radar was a British secret, that one angry decision by Hitler threw the battle away. Some of these are true, some half true and some simply wrong.
The battle in numbers
- 10 July – 31 October
- the British official dates of the battle, 1940
- About 3,000
- RAF Fighter Command aircrew who flew in it, "the Few"
- Over 500
- of them killed
- About 2,600
- German aircrew killed or missing
- Nearly 2,000
- German aircraft destroyed
- 10–20 minutes
- roughly how long a Bf 109 could stay over London before turning for home
The battle in brief
After the fall of France in June 1940, Britain refused to make peace. On 16 July Hitler issued a directive to prepare a landing in southern England, later code-named Operation Sea Lion. The German navy, badly weakened in Norway, could only hope to carry an army across the Channel if the Luftwaffe first destroyed the Royal Air Force and kept the Royal Navy away from the crossing.
The fighting went through several phases. In July and early August the Luftwaffe attacked convoys in the Channel and the ports of the south coast. On 13 August, which the Germans called Eagle Day, it turned to the RAF itself. Two days later, on 15 August, it launched its largest effort yet, including raids from Norway and Denmark on northern England, which met heavy losses. From late August to the first week of September, German bombers concentrated on the airfields of No. 11 Group around London, and Fighter Command came under its greatest strain. Then, on 7 September, the Luftwaffe switched to London. The Blitz had begun. After the defeat of the raids of 15 September and the postponement of Sea Lion, German daylight raids gradually gave way to night bombing, which went on until May 1941.
How the defence worked
Britain's advantage lay less in any one machine than in a system built up over the previous four years under the head of Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. In simple terms, it worked like this:
- Radar stations of the Chain Home network along the coast detected aircraft forming up over France, up to about 150 km away, and estimated their range, bearing and rough numbers.
- Once the raids crossed the coast, where radar could not follow them, thousands of volunteers of the Observer Corps tracked them by eye and ear and telephoned in their reports.
- At Fighter Command headquarters at Bentley Priory, a filter room merged the reports into a single picture and passed it to the group and sector operations rooms.
- There, plotters moved markers across large map tables, and controllers decided which squadrons to scramble, and radioed them toward the enemy.
The system meant fighters did not have to waste time and fuel patrolling the sky. They could stay on the ground until a raid was coming and then meet it with the forces available. Its weak point was the sector airfields that housed the operations rooms, which is why the late-August attacks were so dangerous.
Claim 1: The RAF was hopelessly outnumbered
Partly true. The Luftwaffe began the battle with more than 2,500 aircraft available in the west, against roughly 700 fighters in Fighter Command's front-line squadrons. On a given day, British pilots often met formations several times their own number. But the balance was not as uneven as the totals suggest. Most German aircraft were bombers, which needed fighter escorts, and the German single-engine fighter force was roughly the same size as the British one. British factories, driven hard by the new Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook, were building fighters faster than Germany: during the summer of 1940 British output was more than double the German figure. The real shortage was trained pilots, not aircraft.
Claim 2: The Spitfire won the battle
Mostly false. The Supermarine Spitfire became the symbol of the battle and was the RAF's best fighter in 1940, a close match for the German Messerschmitt Bf 109. But Fighter Command had many more Hawker Hurricanes, an older and slower design that was easier to build and repair. Hurricanes made up the majority of the fighter squadrons and were credited with most of the German aircraft destroyed. Where possible, controllers sent Spitfires against the escorting fighters and Hurricanes against the bombers.
Claim 3: Radar was a British secret
False. Germany had radar too, and in some respects its sets were more advanced. German intelligence knew about the tall masts on the English coast and attacked several stations in August, but it underrated what they did, and the attacks were not followed up. What the Germans failed to grasp was the network behind the masts: the way the radar picture was linked to observers, operations rooms and fighters by telephone and radio. That system, rather than radar alone, was Britain's real advantage.
Claim 4: Switching to London cost Germany the battle
Debated. On the night of 24 August, German bombers that had lost their way dropped bombs on London. The next night the RAF bombed Berlin, and an angry Hitler announced that British cities would be razed in reply. The decision to make London the main target from 7 September gave the hard-pressed airfields of No. 11 Group a breathing space, and many accounts treat it as the turning point. Historians are more cautious today. They point out that Fighter Command was strained but not close to collapse, and that German commanders had their own reasons for attacking London: they believed the RAF was nearly finished and that a big raid on the capital would force its last fighters into the air to be destroyed. The losses of 15 September showed them that they were wrong.
Claim 5: Without the Few, Britain would have been invaded
Uncertain. Victory in the air was a condition for invasion, not a guarantee of it. Even with air superiority, the Germans would have had to move an army across the Channel in river barges towed by tugs, in the face of the Royal Navy, which had far more warships in home waters than the German navy could gather. Many historians doubt that Sea Lion could have succeeded, and some doubt that Hitler was ever fully committed to it. But nobody in Britain could know that in 1940, and the outcome of the air battle decided whether the question would ever be put to the test.
Claim 6: It was a British battle
Only in part. About one in five of the aircrew who flew with Fighter Command came from outside the United Kingdom. The largest groups were from Poland, New Zealand, Canada and Czechoslovakia, and there were also Australians, South Africans, Belgians, Free French, Irishmen and a handful of Americans. The Polish No. 303 Squadron joined the battle late, at the end of August, and finished it with one of the highest scores of any RAF squadron. On the ground, the system also depended on the work of tens of thousands of others, many of them women of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force, who plotted the raids and staffed the operations rooms.
"So many to so few"
On 20 August 1940, at the height of the battle, Churchill told the House of Commons that never in the field of human conflict had so much been owed by so many to so few. The phrase gave the RAF's fighter pilots their name. The two commanders who had run their part of the battle did not share the glory for long. Dowding and Park had argued with other senior officers, especially over the use of large formations of fighters, the "Big Wing", favored by Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory of No. 12 Group. Within weeks of the battle's end, Dowding had been removed from Fighter Command and Park from No. 11 Group. Leigh-Mallory took Park's place.
15 September is still marked in Britain as Battle of Britain Day. The Battle of Britain Bunker at Uxbridge, from which Park ran the battle, has been preserved with its map table as it was in 1940, and the national memorial to the Few stands on the cliffs at Capel-le-Ferne near Folkestone.
On the map
The Battle of Britain was fought in the air over southern England and the Channel, and it has no single battlefield, so our dataset has no flag for it. The globe link below flies to London and the south-east, where most of the fighting took place.
In the Warsmap data
- Within 100 km of central London our records hold 38 battles. Only one of them is from 1940: Graveney Marsh in Kent, about 77 km to the east-southeast, where on 27 September soldiers of the London Irish Rifles exchanged fire with the crew of a German bomber that had crash-landed on the marshes. It is often called the last battle fought on English soil against a foreign enemy.
- The five other 1940 battles within 300 km all lie across the Channel, from Boulogne to Dunkirk and Arras: the campaign in France that came just before the battle in the air.
- Twelve of the 38 battles near London belong to the 1600s, mostly to the English Civil War. Hastings (1066) lies about 78 km to the south-southeast.
Counted from Warsmap’s own records. The map only holds battles recorded in Wikidata, so these figures describe our dataset, not the full history of the area.
More from this era
- The Normandy Landings (D-Day), 1944
- The Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941
- The Battle of Stalingrad, 1942–1943
- The Battle of the Bulge, 1944–1945
From the Warsmap data
Further reading
Battle of Britain · Dowding system · Hugh Dowding · Operation Sea Lion
Facts in this article are summarized from the Wikipedia articles above and other standard references. Wikipedia text is available under CC BY-SA 4.0. Spotted an error? See our corrections policy.